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COMMENT
STATE COURTS PONDER FREE SPEECH
When society is in a flux, the easy answer to difficult questions can
often be found in the satement that "times are changing." The recently
expanded rights of labor can be explained by examining the change in
personnel of the United States Supreme Court. A lawyer may fall back
upon this approach to meet an old case which is directly opposed to the
interests of his client. While the social and economic philosophy of
judges attains its greatest importance in problems of constitutional law,
and while the practicing attorney should, as a practical matter, notice
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the former attitudes of each member of the Court upon constitutional
problems, he would be ill-advised to argue that Case X should be over-
ruled because the membership of that Court has changed. General con-
stitutional language must of necessity be construed and influenced by
the personalities of those called upon to determine its meaning, yet the
attorney should be subtle and should proceed to build his argument upon
legal principles. Thus the change in judicial attitude toward labor by the
United States Supreme Court has in one very important field, picketing,
been placed upon the constitutional guaranty of free speech.,
Just as one should consider, but not rely solely upon, a change in
personnel of the Court, so should one appreciate the impact of World
War II upon labor law, yet not hope to solve a particular case by saying:
"Today, we are at war." Undoubtedly America's participation in the
international conflict will and should affect the rights of both labor and
management, but legal thinking should guide the approach to each phase
of the problem. We still think in terms of complete victory for the United
Nations, and at least the majority of the American people now intend to
return to our constitutional, democratic, capitalistic system of govern-
ment at the war's conclusion. Let us assume that we shall win the war,
that we shall retain some form of capitalism and that our Constitution
will stay on the books, and then try to determine the present relationship
between labor controversies and free speech on the theory that, regard-
less of what happens in the next few years, basic constitutional principles
will remain important, or will at least regain importance in the future..
2
This article will deal particularly with the control exercised by the
United States Supreme Court over various state policies toward picket-
ing, and will examine the coupling of that labor activity with freedom
of speech. The recent Supreme Court holdings on this subject may have
ramifications throughout the field of labor law. Some of these impacts
will be suggested, and reference will be made to legal writings discussing
particular phases in detail. Washington cases will be examined in the
light of federal judicial pronouncements, and the effect of the specific
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court upon analagous fact
patterns presented to the different state courts will be considered.
That different sanctions prevail in the laws of the various states is a
necessary concomitant of the federal system. Congress can enact legis-
lation which affirmatively unifies the law throughout the nation, but in
one sense the Supreme Court acts only negatively, 3 that is, it can deter-
'American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941); Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union,
310 U. S. 468, 478 (1937). At least much of the language of the older cases
has been swept away. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921) ("It [picket-
ing parade] was moral coercion by illegal annoyance and obstruction,
and thus it was plainly a conspiracy."); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
City Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921) (only one picket can be placed
at each entrance to the employer's plant, and they must not argue with
those wishing to pass the picket line.).
-In the last two Washington labor cases (but before Pearl Harbor)
Justice Millard has had considerable to say about the war. Weyerhaeuser
Timber Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash. Dec. 377, 119 P. (2d)
643 (1941); S. & W. Fine Foods, Inc. v. Retail Drivers' and Salesmen's
Union, 111 Wash. Dec. 168, 118 P. (2d) 962 (1941).
'Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), where an attempt was made to give
uniformity to the law by "persuading" the state courts to follow the
"general law" to be declared in the federal courts, and the recognition
of the failure of this attempt in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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mine only those factual situations which are carried before that body.
Legislation promulgates general doctrine; case law deals with specific
application of the law. This "hit or miss" feature has injected much con-
fusion into labor controversies. Many different factual situations contain
a question as to relationship between picketing and freedom of speech,
yet the Supreme Court has considered only a few of them. What about
the others? Are they to be decided in the same way simply because they
have some of the features of the decided cases? What can and cannot
the state courts do in the field of injunctive relief? Do the picketing
cases govern secondary boycotts or the right to call a strike? These are
some of the problems confronting one who tries to analyze a particular
labor controversy today.
Just one more thought by way of introduction. A recent Washington
case exemplifies the dilemma that state courts experience in handling a
labor controversy which involves a federal constitutional problem.4 The
case provoked six separate opinions, three members of the court being
the most that could be mustered to subscribe to any one line of approach.
Many states are finding that their policy toward the rights of pickets
must be modified, and others are trying to determine if the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on picketing extend into other aspects of
labor activities. Can state courts do anything but bring confusion .out
of chaos? This article may not answer that question, but it will certainly
show why the question can be asked.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PICKETING
A few years ago the legality of picketing was largely a matter of state
policy, enunciated most frequently through the courts in injunction
cases rather than through the legislatures. If the picketing was peaceful
and no actual intimidation was involved, most courts found it lawful.,
The view of a substantial number of courts on the other side of the
fence is colorfully set out in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee6 where
the court declared that there "can be no such thing as peaceful picketing,
any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or
lawful lynching." While this minority doctrine cannot be sustained
today,7 it reflects a general feeling still prevalent that the propriety of
picketing is not beyond question. Really, the law of peaceful picketing
is largely a problem of social justification for harm done. The inter-
est of the picketing union in attaining an objective, the interest of
'the one injured, and the general interest of society are thrown upon
the scales, and then the judge puts his hand upon the side that appeals
to his personal philosophy.8 Picketing hurts the employer; that is the
reason he is picketed as part of a program to force him to accede to union
demands. It is an intentional injury to property which must be justified.
Many cases appear to see the injury and to hold for the employer
'Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash. Dec.
377, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941).
"See Sayre, Labor and the Courts (1930) 34 YALE L. J. 682, 701, note 72
(case authority).
6139 Fed. 582 (C.C.S.D. Iowa, 1905). See cases cited infra note 59.
7See discussion and cases, infra, page 169. But see Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash. Dec. 377, 386, 119 P. (2d) 643,
647 (1941), Steinert, J. (dissenting): 'Indeed, the term 'peaceful picketing',
though in itself a mixed metaphor .... ." (Italics supplied).
8TELLER, LABoR DIsPUTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) §§ 73, 190
et seq.
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immediately without considering the question of justifiable cause.'
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering'0 laid the foundation for employer
protection by the Constitution. A secondary boycott11 was held illegal.
Then came Truax v. Corrigan2 and the Court cited the Duplex case for
the proposition that an employer's business is a property right, and
went on to hold that such a right cannot "arbitrarily or capriciously"
be left unprotected by a rigid state anti-injunction act. The normal rule
is that one has no vested right in common law practices (an injunction
against picketing).13 The Court nevertheless said that if a state permits
wrongful and highly injurious invasions of property rights through
improper picketing, that state violates the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
1 4
Peaceful picketing has never been regarded as a misnomer by the
Supreme Court, nor likened to "chaste vulgarity." Shortly before the
Truax case, Mr. Chief Justice Taft had broadly declared in the famous
Tri-City case' 5 that labor unions had the unquestioned right of peaceful
persuasion. Perhaps this was just lip service, since the opinion proceeded
to justify only the presence of one picket at each entrance to the plant,
but the holding at least purported to try to balance the interests of
labor and capital. The subsequent Truax opinion showed that this right
of "peaceful persuasion" was strictly limited.
During the last decade, state legislatures have attempted to limit the
power of courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes through the anti-
injunction acts,' but many courts have met these challenges by
strained, even distorted, constructions.' 7 Congress passed the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932, thereby restraining injunctions in labor dis-
putes involving interstate commerce or coming before the federal
courts. 18 Federal protection of employees in intrastate labor contro-
9A good collection of cases can be found in Sayre, supra note 5, at
702, note 73.
110254 U. S. 443 (1921).
in,,... to exercise coercive pressure on customers, actual or prospective,
in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw their patronage, through
fear of loss or damage to themselves," id. at 446; See Barnard and Graham,
Labor and the Secondary Boycott, (1940) 15 WASH. L. REv. 137 (1940).
1-2257 U. S. 312 (1921)
13N. Y. Central Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1916).
"Other forms of property invasions, such as nuisances, were enjoin-
able in the state court; therefore, plaintiff-employer was denied equal
protection.
15American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257
U. S. 184, 209 (1921) --"Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to
enlarge their membership and especially among those whose labor at lower
wages will injure their whole guild. It is impossible to hold such per-
suasion and propaganda without more, to be without excuse and mali-
cious." See also, Sayre, supra note 5, at 703.
"ORESTATEMENT. ToRTs (1939) § 813. See also note 62, infra.
"
1New York, a jurisdiction historically liberal toward labor, reversed
its attitude after the passage of an anti-injunction act; that court now
refuses to find a "labor dispute," thus limiting the scope of the statute,
unless the objective of the union bears some direct relation to wages,
hours, or conditions of employment. People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36
N. E. (2d) 206 (1941); American Guild v. Petrillo, 286 N. Y. 226, 36 N. E.
(2d) 123 (1941); Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d)
349 (1941). The Washington court has tampered with its anti-injunction
act until it is impossible to determine its status today. Jaffe, Status of
Picketing in Washington (1940) 15 WASH. L. REv. 47.
1s47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 101 et seq. (Supp. 1941). Cf. the
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1927).
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versies, however, was not suggested until later.
The injury to an employer's business by adverse labor activity has
already been noted, and the Supreme Court gave the employer a con-
stitutional weapon in the form of the fourteenth amendment.19 Capital
could place two weights on its side of the scales-a tortious injury and
a constitutional guaranty of property rights. Labor, however, could
display but one-the right to improve its status in the economic struc-
ture.2 0 In 1937 the Supreme Court discovered the constitutional argu-
ment which could be added to labor's side df the scales. Senn v. Tile
Layers Protective Union2 involved pickets demonstrating peacefully,
and the dispute in court was about the purpose of the picketing. The
employer bemoaned the lower court's refusal to protect him against
picketing unaccompanied by a strike, but the Supreme Court held that
the fourteenth amendment did not guarantee his right of injunction
against peaceful picketing. This significant dictum followed:
"Members of a union might, without special statutory au-
thorization by a state, make known the facts of a labor dispute,
for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the federal Constitu-
tion.",22
The shuffle preceding the new deal for labor was started.
The dictum of the Senn case was not forgotten, and within three
years the Court had a clear cut opportunity to place freedom of speech
in the Digests under "Labor". In Thornhill v. Alabama23 a state statute
making it a crime to picket peacefully was held unconstitutional be-
cause of employees' constitutional right of free speech under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A similar county ordinance
received the same treatment in the next breath of the court.2'
The scope of the Thornhill decision was, of course, ambiguous. Its
language intimated that freedom of speech was an overriding constitu-
tional dogma which might justify labor activity fbrmerly frowned upon
by the most liberal of courts.2 5 The facts, however, were confined to
peaceful picketing of an employer's place of business by employee dis-
putants.
Force, violence and riots were soon excluded from the constitutional
protection, and new groundwork for the power of states to control
picketing, at least partially, was laid. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairy.2 6 affirmed an Illinois injunction which prohibited
all picketing because the "picketing in this case was set in a background
of violence.12 7 The Supreme Court recognized that the police power of
the state may outweigh the constitutional right of self-expression. One
"9See discussion, supra page 158.
2"Many judges doubted if this was of any weight at all. See discussion,
supra page 157. Perhaps this explains the reluctance of Chief Justice
'Taft to permit more than one picket at each entrance to the plant in the
Tri-City case, supra note 15.
21301 U. S. 468 (1937).
2Id. at 478.
23310 U. S. 88 (1940).2 Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
2"For example, picketing of remote parties in secondary boycott cases.
See Barnard and Graham, supra note 11; discussion, infra page 170, et seq.28312 U. S. 287 (1941).
17Id. at 294.
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may speak strongly, but if he accompanies his language with a right to
the jaw, he may lose his right to speak at all. Labor found that free
speech has at least one limitation.
Capital's headache following the Thornkill case was relieved but very
temporarily by the aspirin of the Meadowmoor decision, for on the same
day the Court sent employers scurrying for more and bigger ice packs.
Wishful thinking was torn asunder by a new decision which refused to
limit the Thornhill case to its immediate facts. American Federation of
Labor v. Swing2s held that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
discussion was infringed by the common law policy of a state which
forbade peaceful picketing when there was no immediate employer-
employee dispute. A beauty shop union picketed an establishment where
none of the employees were union members, and the injunction granted
by the state court was set aside by the High Tribunal. The Meadowmoor
limitation on free speech was characterized as exceptional, for the Court
said in reference to that holding:
".... we held that acts of picketing when blended with violence
may have a significance which neutralizes the constitutional
immunity which such acts would have in isolation. 29
The opinion also threw a scare that so-called secondary or remote
picketing might be protected when peaceful-"the interdependence of
economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become com-
monplace." 30 Capital had to wait until the next year for a decision which
began the job of drawing the line beyond which the speech of pickets
is not "free" 31
At this point in our consideration of the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments in labor controversies, it seems advisable to pause for a moment
and to consider the wisdom of identifying picketing with freedom of
speech. An eminent authority, Mr. Ludwig Teller, has entitled a section
of his treatise on labor law, "Unwisdom of the Identification". 32 The
gist of his criticism is to be found in these excerpts:
"Shall the right to picket claim its source in the idea of free
speech or shall it rather be obliged, as a prima facie tort, to
justify its exercise? Because picketing involves not only the ex-
ercise of free speech but something more, it is contended here
that the latter frame of reference is the preferable one ...
The marching to and fro before the premises of the person
picketed, banner in hand of the marcher, involves the practice
of picketing in a distinction which invokes the category of
tort". 33
The author then calls attention to the ramifications of a constitu-
tional guaranty of all peaceful picketing, and considers the "hard cases",
such as picketing of remote parties, picketing for closed shops, or
28312 U. S. 321 (1941).
2Id. at 323.
n°Id. at 326.
"The possibility of a restraint other than violence upon freedom of
speech had been foreshadowed in the Thornhill case, supra note 23, at 105.
"The power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the
peace and to protect the privacy, the lives and the property of its residents
cannot be doubted." The "next year" decision is Carpenters' and Joiners'
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942), infra. page 162.
32 TELLER, supra note 8, § 136.
:"Ibid.
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picketing in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Freedom of
speech is not to be restrained at place X simply because the same
thought can be expressed at place Y,3 4 and Mr. Teller anticipated
that, if consistent, the Court would be reluctant to permit state in-
junctions although the "picketing bids fair to become a social menace
instead of a desirable aid to the achievement of new rights ...
Beyond the sphere of the labor controversy, it is submitted that the
practice of picketing ought not to extend."35 The Court has recently had
a few things to say about these ramifications, and a: consideration of
them will constitute a good portion of this article. At least a wavy
line has been drawn about freedom of speech, and the dissenters ihi the
case cried "inconsistent". 36 Perhaps the criticism discussed above is
justified.
Another consideration, however, was overlooked by Mr. Teller.
Earlier in this article, the constitutional protection of capital was men-
tioned, and it was noted that labor ad nothing to argue on its side
except the right to improve its station in life." To approach picketing
as a tort, constitutionally redressable, which must then be justified, is
all right analytically; but when in practice many state courts 31 and state
legislatures 39 can see no justification, a more dogmatic basis upon which
labor can stand is needed. Perhaps freedom of speech gives too much
rope to labor interests, but if we remember that too much rope may
hang a man, the likelihood is great that courts will work out a balanc-
ing of interests which is more just than that which existed before labor
was given its constitutional prop. Whether labor must "justify its tort"
or use its freedom of speech "reasonably" may be but two ways of ex-
pressing the same idea. The latter language, however, reverses the
emphasis, and gives to the former underdog an opportunity to receive
better treatment in the courts. By interspersing a constitutional issue
into labor injunction cases, the Supreme Court has placed itself in a
position to police prejudiced state rulings, regardless of which way the
prejudice runs.4 0
Bakery and Pastry Drivers v. Wokl 4 1 extended the scope of the
Swing case 42 in two directions. The Court ruled that a union cannot be
3
'Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939).
3 MTLER, supra note 8, § 136. Accord: Carpenters' and Joiners' Union
v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942). ,36See discussion of Carpenters' and Joiners' Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 62
Sup. Ct. 807 (1942), infra page 163.37See discussion, supra page 159.3aWashington, for example: Danz v. American Federation of Musicians.
133 Wash. 186, 233 Pac. 630 (1925) and earlier cases cited therein.
'
0Alabama statute, for example, in Thornhill v. Alabama, supra note 23.
'
0Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 12, policed a denial to the employer of
his common law remedy. Labor, now, has the decisions springing from
the Senn dictum, supra notes 21, 22, which can be called upon to retard
anti-labor judges. See discussion of the Washington court's anxious eye
toward the Supreme Court of the United States when it considers labor
controversies, inf$ra page et. seq.
Labor leaders are open to censure for many of their practices, but it
must be remembered that capital held the whip-hand ungraciously for
a long time. Labor's attitude of retaliation and retribution for past wrongs
is the damning factor in all labor controversies that prompts one to con-
demn their cause in toto.
1262 Sup. Ct. 816 (1942).
2Supra note 28.
1942]
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enjoined from picketing retail establishments that purchase bakery
products from a "peddler" who employs no help. Although there was
no "labor dispute" in the Swing case, because the employees were un-
attached to the picketing union, the plaintiff there was an employer of
labor. The Wohl opinion, however, gave constitutional sanction to
picketing prompted because a man did all his own work.4 3
The other extension of the right to picket found in the Wohl case
arose because the picketing was secondary. Wohl's customers were the
ones picketed, and the Court held that, at the least, a product can be
traced by constitutionally protected pickets."
"A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all cir-
cumstances even peaceful picketing of an individual. But so
far as we can tell, respondent's mobility and their insulation
from the public as middlemen made it practically impossible
for petitioners to make known their legitimate grievances to
the public whose patronage was sustaining the peddler system
except by the means here employed and contemplated; and
those means are such as to have slight, if any, repercussions
upon the interests of strangers to the issue."41 5
Employers who read the Wohl case before noticing the decision in
Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 4 6 handed down the same
day, undoubtedly shuddered and thought that the fondest dreams of
labor had come true-that practically any peaceful picketing would be
protected by the Federal Constitution--despite the broad statement in
the first sentence of the above quoted portion of the opinion."
While rules turning upon degree create uncertainty in the law, un-
restrained peaceful picketing is socially undesirable. Mr. Teller's
criticism4 8 would be soundly justified if the Supreme Court did not at
some time limit the impact of the fourteenth amendment upon labor
"The union wanted Wohl to join and to work only six days a week,
or in the alternative, to hire a union helper for the seventh day. Since
Wohl made about $35.00 a week working seven days, he refused. Besides
the union's purpose of more dues, the defendant also wanted to protect
union peddlers from being undersold by a "scab" distributional system.
"Id. at 819. See also Carpenters' and Joiners' Union v. Ritter's Cafe,
62 Sup. Ct. 807, 810 (1942) where this is said about the Wohl case: "In
picketing the retail establishments the union members would only be fol-
lowing the subject matter of their dispute."
"5Ibid. Justice Douglas, concurring, dislikes the reference to the lack
of monetary injury resulting from the picketing. He says: "If the opinion
in this case means that a State can prohibit picketing when it is effective
but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective, then I think we have made
a basic departure from Thornhill v. Alabama . . ." Id. at 819. The majority
opinion does not strike the present writer as so implying. Rather the
language intimates that the Court is testing the justification for the state
injunction, and trying to balance all the elements. Certainly the degree
of injury resulting from the injury compared to the futility or impropriety
of the picketing should be of importance. It is of importance unless one is
carried away by the dogmatic idea that all picketing must necessarily be
tolerated because of the fourteenth amendment-an assumption that fails
to recognize other elements involved in picketing besides free speech.
,* 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942).
,7 Only the first sentence of the quoted portion from the Wohi case,
above, points the other way. Undoubtedly Justice Jackson had the Ritter
case in mind.
"4 Supra page 160.
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controversies. This limitation appears in the now three months' old
Ritter case.49 Whether the suit in which the Court chose to enunciate
the doctrine that each case must be determined upon its own facts5"
required a break from the flat rule that free speech justifies all picket-
ing, may be subject to argument. At least four members of the Court
thought the injunction should be set aside. From a reading of the two
dissenting opinions, however, one suspects that at least three of these
Justices quarrel not only with the application of the limitation to the
Ritter case, but also with the proper existence of any limitation at all
upon peaceful picketing. The latter dogma is too arbitrary. Although
capital had a great advantage at one time in labor disputes, the courts
should not think in terms of retribution, as do some labor union leaders,
but in principles of equality. Two wrongs do not make a right. The
scales should not favor labor simply because they improperly favored
capital before the error was discovered.
Ritter hired a contractor to erect a building for him about a mile and
a half from his restaurant. All the employees of the cafe were union men,
but the contractor used non-union help. Pickets from the Carpenter's
Union placed at the restaurant caused a strike and dissuaded union
suppliers from passing the picket line. Ritter's Cafe suffered a 60%
decrease in business. An injunction against the picketing was affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court in a five to four decision. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, summarized the holding
in these words:
"But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free
speech does not imply that states must be without power to
confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to
the dispute.... It is 'not for us to assess the wisdom of the
policy underlying the law of Texas. Our duty is at an end when
we find that the fourteenth amendment does not deny her the
pbwer to enact that policy into law."5' 1
At least one dissenter, Mr. Justice Reed, does not "doubt the right
of the state to impose not only some but many restrictions upon peace-
ful picketing." 52 But he quarrels with the majority because free speech
is confined to the "area of the industry within which a labor dispute
arises"-not one of the "many restrictions" justifiable under his reading
of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Reed recognizes the propriety of
some limitations upon the scope of free speech, but feels that the Ritter
case does not call for one of those restrictions.
A reading of the other dissenting opinion, that of Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy, written by the first, is not so comforting. When
Justice Black declares:
'9 Supra note 46.
0". . . the boundary at which conflicting interests balance cannot be
determined by any general formula in advance, but points in the line, or
helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that concrete
case falls on the nearer or farther side .. ." Id. at 809, Hudson Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1908), is the source of this language used
by the Court.511 d., at 810. Italics supplied.
12 Id., at 815. His examples of proper restrictions might be classified as
"breaches of the peace." (". . . reasonable numbers, quietness, truthful
placards, open ingress and egress, suitable hours or other proper limita-
tions not destructive of the right to tell of labor difficulties ... ").
1942]
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"I can see no reason why members of the public should be
deprived of any opportunity to get information which might
enable them to use their influence to tip the scales in favor
of the side they think is right" , 3
and concludes:
"Accepting the constitutional prohibition against any law
'abridging the freedom of speech or of the press'-a prohibition
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment-
as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language,
read in the context of liberty-loving society, will allow . . . I
think the judgment should be reversed."5
one suspects that this Justice feels that peaceful picketing of any place
or any person is protected by the Constitution. If such were the law,
then surely Mr. Teller's prophecy of "social menace" from picketing
would be fulfilled. 5
Granting that the majority is correct in holding that some limitations
should be placed upon the right of free speech in labor disputes, let us
examine the extent of these limitations, and try to determine their
significance in other fact patterns. While the Ritter decision holds that
a balancing of interests should be undertaken in labor controversies,5 6
it gives little indication as to how the elements are to be placed upon the
scales. Texas can prohibit picketing outside the "economic context of
the real dispute",5 7 and "neutrals having no relation to either the dis-
pute or the industry in which it arose" are protected. 58 Beyond these
specific statements we have only the general tenor of the opinion for a
guide. The remainder of this article will concern itself with the prob-
lems confronting state courts when they adjudicate labor contro-
versies left dangling outside the sphere of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court.
THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT FACES THE CONSTITUTION
The history of labor rights in the state of Washington is turbulent.
From an early holding that all picketing is illegal per se, 9 a recent
case has followed the Swing case to the extreme by denying an injunc-
53 Id., at 811.541Id., at 812.
5 See discussion, supra page 161.
5' "The law has undertaken to balance the effort of the employer to
carry on his business free from the interference of others against the
effort of labor to further its economic self-interest. And every interven-
tion of government in this struggle has in some respect abridged the free-
dom of action of one or the other or both .. . [The states are not]
powerless to confine the use of this industrial weapon [picketing] within
reasonable bounds . .. The question always is whether the state has
violated the essential attributes of that liberty . . ." Id., at 808. (Italics
supplied).
57id., at 809.
;1 Id., at 810. The Wohl case is distinguished because the same busi-
ness interest, baked goods, was held both by the plaintiff-disputant and
the picketed retailers.
" Danz v. American Federation of Musicians, 133 Wash. 186, 233 Pac.
630 (1925); Baasch v. Cooks' Union Local, 99 Wash. 378, 169 Pac. 843 (1918);
St. Germain v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers Union, 97 Wash. 282,
166 Pac. 665 (1917); Jensen v. Cooks' and Waiters' Union, 39 Wash. 531, 81
Pac. 1069 (1905).
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tion against picketing for an unlawful purpose" The impact of United
States Supreme Court holdings has been noted in practically all the
recent cases, and peaceful picketing is now clearly recognized as lawful.6 1
Not only has the legality of picketing itself had a hectic career, but
also the effectiveness of anti-injunction legislation has had its ups and
downs in Washington. At one time the Washington Court held our
counterpart of the Norris-La Guardia Act to be unconstitutional, on the
theory that the statute took away an historical tool of equity, the injunc-
tion, in violation of the doctrine of separate powers -.6  The amazing
history of how the court continued to treat the anti-injunction act as
though it were still on the books has received excellent treatment in the
WASHaNGTON LAW REviEw.6 3 While the Washington Court recognized
the statute, it nevertheless proceeded to emasculate its plain language by
granting injunctions unless the "labor dispute" was between an em-
ployer and his employees-this in the teeth of express declaration in
the act that it was to apply "regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 64
Then freedom of speech was encountered by the Washington Court
in a case where, under the prior decisions, injunctive relief was custom-
ary. In O'Neil v. Building Service Employees' International Union"
the plaintiff operated two apartment houses with the assistance of
her family and without the help of outside employees. Defendant union
peacefully picketed the apartment houses in an effort to compel the
plaintiff to join the union. The employer-employee relation did not exist
between the disputants, but the Washington Court denied injunctive
relief, saying that the right of peaceful picketing was guaranteed by the
constitutional right of free spech as defined by the United States Su-
preme Court.
Was the Washington Court correct in thus interpreting the commands
of the Supreme Court? The Wohl66 case was in its lower court infancy
when the O'Neil decision came down, but the subsequent holding of the
Supreme Court denying an injunction to Mr. Wohl indicated that the
Washington Court correctly guessed the attitude of the High Tribunal.
Both Mr. Wohl and Mrs. O'Neil encountered pickets who objected to
"capitalists" working without joining the union. The cases are on all
60 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash. Dec.
377, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941). See discussion, infra page 166.61 ONeil v. Bldg. Service Employees International Union, 9 Wn. (2d)
507, 115 P. (2d) 662 (1941); Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union, 8 Wn. (2d)
492, 113 P. (2d) 28 (1941); Sears v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 8 Wn. (2d) 447, 112 P. (2d) 850 (1941). Cf. Zaat v. Bldg. Trades Coun-
cil, 172 Wash. 445, 20 P. (2d) 589 (1933).
02Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewery, 188 Wash. 396, 63 P. (2d) 397
(1936).
0 Jaffe, supra note 17.
01 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1933, c. 7, § 13, RE. REV. STAT. § 7612-13 (Supp.
1939). See Shively v. Garage Employees' Local Union, 6 Wn. (2d) 560, 108
P. (2d) 354 (1940); United Union Brewing Co. v. Beck, 200 Wash. 474, 95 P.(2d) 772 (1939); Fornili v. Auto Mechanics' Union, 200 Wash. 283, 93 P. (2d)
422 (1939); Adams v. Building Service Employees' Union, 197 Wash. 242,
84 P. (2d) 1021 (1938); Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash.
322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935). Cf. Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash. 564, 94 P.
(2d) 180 (1939).
05 9 Wn. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662 (1941). See also cases cited, supra
note 61.
66 Supra note 41.
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fours except that the picketing complained against by Wohl was sec-
ondary-an additional element which made the Wohl case a harder one.
Washington's toes would have been stepped on by the United States
Supreme Court if our court had enjoined the picketing of Mrs. O'Neil's
apartment houses.
The next encounter in Washington between free speech and the in-
junction was late in 1941. S. & W. Fine Foods Inc. v. Retail Drivers'
and Salesmen's Union 7 involved picketing by the defendant union of
the S. & W. plant because their salesmen, who were perfectly satisfied
with the status quo, had refused to join the union. The Swing case was
directly in point, and the Washington court faced and accepted the
national fiat.""
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers," decided in
December, 1941, was mentioned early in this paper.7 0 Nine judges
required six opinions to express their views concerning the following
factual set-up. The defendant union was in the minority, and sought
to induce the employer-plaintiff to enter an employment contract with
it, although to do so would be in violation of the Wagner Act since the
employer was already under contract with the majority bargaining unit.
The election had not yet been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board, but certification is not necessary before the employer can violate
the Wagner Act by dealing with minorities. The resulting picketing was
not strictly peaceful, for some threats were made which deterred entrance
to the mill. The union was satisfied when the trial court issued an
injunction against the use of more than five pickets at the main entrance
to the plant, but Weyerhaeuser appealed on the ground that all picket-
ing should have been enjoined. Six justices voted for affirmation; three
for reversal and the granting of the complete injunction.
The "majority" opinion, which expressed the views of three men,
found no violence, and followed a line of federal lower court decisions
which had upheld picketing by a minority union after election, but prior
to certification by the N. L. R. B. 7 1
6" 111 Wash. Dec. 168, 118 P. (2d) 962 (1941).
8 The case was much easier than the O'Neil decision, and seemed fore-
closed by the express declaration of the Swing case, yet the employer had
the courage to fight an appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, and
found one justice who silently protested against the Swing rule. (Justice
Steinert dissented without opinion.)
Chief Justice Robinson concurred in the result but only under the com-
pulsion of the Swing doctrine. He feels that the Supreme Court has given
unqualified sanction to peaceful picketing (cf. the subsequent Ritter case,
supra page 162, and bemoans this extension of the right of free speech.
"It [United States Supreme Court] formerly held-and until very recently
-that the right of freedom of speech 'is not absolute,' but 'is subject to
restriction and limitation' . . Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 352 [1920] . .. "
He is probably happy about the wavy line drawn about picketing in the
Ritter case, but undoubtedly still feels that the noose should be pulled
tighter.
"111 Wash. Dec. 377, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941).
7 See discussion, supra page 157.
v1 Lund v. Woodworkers, 19 F. Supp. 697 (D. C. Minn., 1937); Blanken-
ship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); Cupples Co. v. Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, 20 F. Supp. 894 (D. C. Mo., 1937); Sharp and
Dohme v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F. Supp. 701 (D. C.
Penn., 1938); Fur Workers Union Local 72 v. Fur Workers Union, 105 F.(2d) 1 (App. D. C., 1939). Cf. Bloedel Donovan Lbr. Mills v. International
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Chief Justice Robinson reluctantly ,concurred because of the Supreme
Court's declarations in the Swing case. Interestingly enough, considering
his aversion to the free speech rule, the Chief Justice felt forced to add
that:
... there is much reason to think that, should the matter
come before it, the Supreme Court would dissolve even the
comparatively mild injunction which the trial court's order left
in effect. It expressly forbids picketing by more than five
pickets.... Under the doctrine of the Swing and companion
cases, would not the Court be compelled to hold that the in-
junction limiting the picket line to five men deprived each of
the several hundred others of their respective constitutional
rights of freedom of speech?"72
He added that it should be immaterial whether certification had taken
place. If the Wagner Act is interpreted to deny the right to picket after
certification, is not the unqualified right7 3 of free speech unconstitu-
tionally infringed by Congress?74 This interpretation of the Swing case
by a man who does not agree with the basis of that decision confirms
the shudders experienced by capital when that opinion first came down.
State courts must remold their labor policy in conformity to the national
pattern, but they are experiencing great difficulty in determining the
dimensions of that mold.
An examination of three dissenting opinions75 finds them in accord
on the proposition that the threats made to persons wanting to pass the
picket line added violence to the conflict which would justify a complete
injunction under the doctrine of the Meadowmoore case." The lack of
bloodshed, however, takes the Weyerhaeuser case outside the field of
violence, although, as Justice Simpson indicated, injuries were avoided
because the threats were taken seriously.77 The mild injunction granted
by the trial court would probably forestall future violence, and although
the injunction in the Meadowrnoor case was complete, the Court there
Woodworkers, 4 Wn. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d) 270 (picketing after certification,
enjoined). The "majority" in the instant case approved this earlier Wash-
ington case, and said the granting or refusal of an injunction should turn
upon the state of certification proceedings. Accord: Oberman and Co. v.
United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (1937). Contra: Florsheim Shoe
Store Inc. v. Retail Salesman's Union, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 883 (1941) ("labor
dispute" found still to exist regardless of certification, and anti-injunction
act prohibited relief. Free speech not mentioned).
Observe that Weyerhaeuser argued no "labor dispute," relying upon
the cases cited note 64, supra. Justice Blake, however, instead of saying
that free speech makes the cases under the anti-injunction act immaterial,
talked as though these cases were still good law, but distinguishable be-
cause here the minority employees did work for the plaintiff! Id., at 380.72 1d., at 405.73The Chief Justice did not anticipate any limitation upon peaceful
picketing. This opinion was written before the very recent Ritter case,
supra note 46, came down.
7' The first amendment to the Federal Constitution expressly says that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Cf.
United States v. Building and Construction Trades Council of New Orleans,
61 Sup. Ct. 839 (1941) where the Court, upon the authority of United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941), refused to set aside a demurrer
to an action against a union for boycotting after certification.
75 Justices Steinert, Beals and Simpson.
76 Supra page 159.
77Id., at 407.
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expressly added:
"The injunction which we sustain is 'permanent' only for
the temporary period for which it may last. It is justified only
by the violence that induced it and only so long as it counter-
acts a continuing intimidation.
7 8
The best ground of dissent, particularly in light of the subsequent
Ritter case," was founded on the idea that free speech is not an unquali-
fied right, and that since the end sought by the pickets was improper
(Weyerhaeuser would break the law if it dealt with a minority union),
the picketing was enjoinable. Only Justice Steinert presented this
argument. Why should freedom of speech turn on certification?"0 If
picketing outside the economic area of a labor dispute is improper
despite the fourteenth amendment, why cannot the Washington Court
prohibit pickets from trying to induce an unfair labor practice by the
employer? The language of the Ritter case about "balancing of inter-
ests"' 1 is just as applicable to this type of employer protection as it is
to the protection of neutrals.
Thus ends the contemporary history of the engagement between the
Washington Court and the Federal Constitution. It is submitted that
Washington could have granted a complete injunction in the Weyer-
haeuser case without being reversed.8 2 The opinion was written, how-
.ever, before the Ritter case, and for that reason we cannot be too
critical of the holding. Possibly one is wrong in thinking that the Ritter
case will be extended beyond remote picketing, but the recognition of
one limitation by that opinion on free speech leads one to hope that the
Court may be willing to examine purpose in determining the propriety
of peaceful picketing.
LOOSE ENDS
The reception given to the Supreme Court rulings in picketing cases
has not been uniform in the state courts. The Washington cases just
discussed exemplify what might be called a "complete acceptance" of
the identification between free speech and peaceful picketing. Under
this view the necessity of proving justification. for harm done is min-
imized, if not abrogated. When picketing is peaceful,' 2 . the right of
free speech precludes a consideration of the objective sought by the
pickets. If the means are proper, the end cannot be questioned.
78 312 U. S. at 298.
71 But see discussion, infra page 171. The Ritter case turned on the means
employed, not the end sought.
80 It has been held by many federal courts that an employer who deals
with a minority union after election but before certification commits an
unfair labor practice. N. L. R. B. v. Louisville Refining Co., 102 F. (2d)
678 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939); N. L. R. B. v. Piqua Munising Wood Products Co.,
109 F. (2d) 552 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); N. L. R. B. v. Dahlstrom Metalic
Door Co., 112 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1940). Cf. cases cited note 71.
Federal courts must ponder the scope of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
81 See discussion, supra page 164.
812 Accord: White Co. v. Murphy ....... Mass ....... 38 N. E. (2d) 685 (1942).
82a Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash.
Dec. 377, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941); Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky.
657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (1941). Notice how bluntly one law review writer
expresses his interpretation: ". . . the Court has clearly enunciated the
doctrine that all peaceful picketing, no matter what extenuating circum-
stances are shown, is merely to inform the public facts of the dispute, and
hence is not subject to restraint." Syme, The Supreme Court and Labor
Law (1941) 13 PENN. B. A. Q. 40, 45.
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Other courts have given a much cooler reception to the Supreme
Court's ideas. Focusing upon the Meadowmoor case,"' the judges have
noted its citation of language from the Thornhill decision that
"the power and duty of the state to take adequate steps to
preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives and the
property of its residents cannot be doubted." 4
If the object of the picketing is improper according to their own stand-
ards, the activity, although peaceful, is enjoined. This interpretation
practically ignores the Swing case,85 yet unless that case is exactly in
point,88 the courts continue to issue numerous injunctions.87
The Ritter case,88 with its limitation upon remote picketing, sug-
gests a middle position previously taken by some state courts; that is,
peaceful picketing normally is to be protected by the constitutional
guaranty of free speech, but that right is not absolute, and if abused,
an injunction may be warranted. Ritter got his injunction because he
was outside the area of the industrial dispute; the state courts, largely
by dictum, have suggested other limitations upon freedom of speech.
8 9
A fourth group of courts not only holds that the Swing case protects
all picketing as long as it is peaceful, but also construes that decision
to immunize other forms of labor activity from injunctive relief. Ken-
tucky has refused to enjoin a secondary boycott on the authority of the
free speech cases90 and the New Jersey court cited the Swing case when
83 Supra note 26.
81 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 105 (1940).85 Supra note 28. One recent state court opinion cites the Meadowmoor
case, but does not even mention the Swing decision. Borden Co. v. Inter-
natonal Brotherhood of Teamsters, 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).80 Heine's, Inc., v. Truck Drivers' and Helpers' Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 388,
19 A. (2d) 204 (1941); Chrisman v. Culinary Workers' Local- Union .......
Cal ........ 115 P. (2d) 553 (1941); Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky.
657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (1941); Feller v. Loral, 129 N. J. Eq. 42, 19 A. (2d)
784 (1941).87 Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 606 (1941); Petruccie v. Hogan, 27
N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (1941); Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd. v. Milk Drivers' Union,
238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31 (1941). Cf. Chief Justice Robinson's reluctant
acceptance of the inevitable, supra note 68.
Notice also the tendency of some courts to issue mild injunctions, such
as the limiting of the pickets to five at the main entrance to the Weyer-
haeuser plant, when violence is suggested. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v.
Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash. Dec. 377, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941);
Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union 377 Ill. 76, 35 N E. (2d) 349 (1941);
2063 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N. E. (2d) 373
(1941). The Meadowmoor injunction, on the other hand, was blanket.
See discussion, supra page 159.
88 Supra page 162.89Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440
(1941); Lora Lee Dress Co. v. International Garment Workers, 129 N. J. Eq.
368, 19 A. (2d) 659 (1941); Heine's v. Truck Drivers' Union, 129 N: J. Eq.
388, 19 A. (2d) 204 (1941); People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d)
206 (1941); Alliance Auto Service v. Cohen, 341 Penn. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152
(1941). White Co. v. Murphy ....... Mass....... 38 N. E. (2d) 685 (1941) granted
an injunction on facts similar to those in the Weyerhaeuser case. If this de-
cision is appealed to the United States Supreme Court, a troublesome
area in the law of picketing should be clarified. See discussion, infra p. 172.
00 Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440
(1941). See also 2063 Lawrence Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37,
1942]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
it recently denied an injunction against a threatened secondary strike.91
In the past, many courts held that unless the pickets and the employer
stood in the relationship of employer-employee, the picketing was im-
proper.2 The direct holding in the Swing case settled this controversy,
and the state courts have recognized that free speech places such picket-
ing beyond an injunction.93
Even before the Wohl case,9" which held unconstitutional an injunc-
tion against the picketing of a man doing all his own work, the Wash-
ington Court refused to enjoin this form of picketing on the authority of
the Swing case.99 When the Supreme Court reversed the granting of an
injunction to Wohl, it demonstrated the accuracy of that interpretation.
The legality of picketing third persons, however, is completely up in
the air. Although the Wohl case says that free speech guarantees the
right to picket retailers who buy from a "peddler" of baked goods, the
Ritter opinion refers to such secondary picketing as justifiable only
because it follows the subject matter of the dispute, 6 and proceeds
then to hold that picketing must be confined to the economic area of
the controversy. Although some figures of speech are framed in terms
of the place of the picketing in the Ritter case, the thought underlying
the decision is the protection of strangers. Wohl's business interest is
the same as that of his customers-the distribution of baked goods;
Ritter's restaurant has no business connection with a building inciden-
tally being constructed for him by a non-union contractor.
Observe also that in the Wohl case an immediate disputant requested
the injunction, while in the Ritter case it was the third party who sought
judicial relief. Will the Supreme Court attach any significance to the
nature of the party plaintiff?9 7 Will they make the scope of free speech
depend upon product-tracing, or upon unity of interest?99 Will they
35 N. E. (2d) 373 (1941). The secondary boycott is outside the scope
of this paper. See TELLER, supra note 8, Chap. 9; Barnard and Graham,
supra note 11.
"
1Kingston Trap Rock Co. v. Local No. 825, 129 N. J. Eq. 570, 19 A. (2d)
440 (1941). On the secondary strike, see TELLER, supra note 8, Chap. 7.
See also: Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941),
cert. denied, 62 Sup. Ct. 96 (federal question not decided by lower court).
Union officials were enjoined. Does enjoining the officials rather than
the members themselves evade the constitutional issue of free speech?
See a good collection of state labor statutes in Smith and DeLancey,
The State Legislatures and Unionism (1940) 38 MICH. L. REV. 987. Cf. a col-
lection of federal "Anti-Fifth Column" statutes, some of which may affect
organized labor, Comment (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 159.
92 TELLER, supra note 8, §§ 117-8.
93 S. & W. Fine Foods, Inc. v. Retail Drivers and Salesmen Union, 111
Wash. Dec. 168, 118 P. (2d) 962 (1941), and cases cited, supra note 86.
91 Supra note 41.
9 O'Neil v. Building Service Employees' International Union, 9 Wn. (2d)
507, 115 P. (2d) 662 (1941). Cf. Coman v. Osman, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 353,
which is in accord, but does not go on the basis of free speech. See also:
Feinberg v. Pappas, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 5 (1941); Friedman v. Blumberg, 342
Penn. 570, 21 A. (2d) 41 (1941) (the picketed-plaintiff occasionally had
outside help).
11 See discussion, supra page 162. This appears to be the doctrine of
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937). See Barnard
and Graham, supra note 11, at 155.
17 Most state courts make no distinction. See TELLER, supra note 8, § 123.98 See note 96, supra.
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strictly confine picketing to the industrial area of the primary dispute? 99
Three recent opinions of state courts, all citing the free speech cases,
have refused an injunction at the request of a third person who was in
a position to bring pressure upon the immediate disputant and thereby
aid the union cause,100 but only the future decisions of the High Court
can accurately answer these questions.
In the Ritter case the proprietor of the restaurant could have chosen
a union contractor originally, but having contracted with a non-union
man, what pressure could he bring without breaching his contract?1 0'
Without discussing this problem, the New York Court of Appeals has
upheld picketing aimed at inducing the plaintiff to break his contract
with a non-union supplier.1 0 2 Somewhat analogously, the Washington
Court refused to enjoin pickets who were trying to induce Weyerhaeuser
to break the law. 0 3 Since the Ritter case turned upon the remoteness
of the picketing to the primary dispute,) the purpose of the picketing was
not considered. Until the Supreme Court finds it necessary to consider
this element, another aspect of picketing remains in doubt.' 0 '
90 Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, (1942).
200 Alliance Auto Service, Inc., v. Cohen, 341 Penn. 283, 19 A. (2d) 152
(1941) (picketing of retailer who bought from disputant-wholesaler);
Lora Lee Dress Co. v. International Garment Workers, 129 N. J. Eq. 368,
19 A. (2d) 659 (picketing of "parent" corporation of independent sub-
sidiary corporate-disputant); Ellingsen v. Milk Dealers' Union, 377 ILI.
76, 35 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941) (picketing of retailers purchasing from an
"improper" [union-wise] distributional system). It would seem that the
Wohl case supports the first and last of those cases, but would a parent
corporation be "remote" under the rule of the Ritter case?
Contra: Borden Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters . .....
Tex ........ 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (1941).
101 Of course, Ritter could have offered to pay the contractor the dif-
ference in cost of the building due to union labbr. But suppose the
contract was let by bid? Does a man have to investigate the bidders, and
accept only bids from union contractors in order that he may be relieved
of the danger of future picketing, or the duty of paying more money
for his building to avoid picketing?
Since the Wagner Act is quasi-criminal, the Court may distinguish
between picketing to induce a breach of the law (Weyerhaeuser case) and
picketing to induce a breach of contract (Ritter case). The contract prob-
lem is complicated by the additional fact, that all labor is at least on a day
by day contract. When is the picketing "inducing the breach of a recog-
nized contract?"
102 People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941).
03 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Lumber Workers, 111 Wash. Dec.
377, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941). Contra: White v. Murphy ....... Mass ........ 38 N. E.
(2d) 685 (1941) See note 101 for explanation of the "analogy."
101 The question, "Can state courts look at the end sought by the pickets,
or only at the nature of the picketing itself?" arises in other fact patterns.
Since the Swing case, the courts refuse to enjoin picketing for a closed
shop. Lora Lee Dress Co., Inc. v. International Garment Workers. 129 N. J.
Eq. 368, 19 A. (2d) 659 (1941); Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky.
657, 151 S. W. (2d) 440 (1941); Haines' v. Truck Drivers' Union, 129 N. J.
Eq. 308, 19 A. (2d) 204 (1941); Friedman v. Blumberg, 342 Penn. 570, 21 A.
(2d) 41 (1941). Cf. Weber v. Opera on Tour, Inc., 285 N. Y. 384, 34 N. E. (2d)
349 (1941), cert. denied, 62 Sup Ct. 96 (1941).
What will happen to earlier cases which enjoined picketing because
it was for an "unlawful" purpose; e. g.: illegal to picket to coerce set-
tlement of a cause of action for damages, Jensen v. St. Paul Moving
Pictures, 149 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811 (1935); pickets enjoined from seeking
to compel an employer to fix minimum prices for his product as prescribed
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Reading the Wohl and Ritter cases together, it would appear that
when the Court said in the latter that picketing must be confined to the
area of the industrial dispute, it had reference to the intimacy of rela-
tionship between the disputant and the person picketed, rather than to
the physical locality of the demonstrations. The picketing of the homes
of the disputants, therefore, is probably still unsettled, and state courts
will continue to be in doubt whether to continue to enjoin such activity.
One court argued by analogy from the Swing case to justify its refusal
of an injunction against pickets placed outside the residence of an em-
ployee,105 but as yet there is a dearth of recent cases. Perhaps the right
of privacy, mentioned in the Thornhill case'016 as an exception, will be
considered strong enough by the Supreme Court to lead that body to
hold that state policy can continue to determine this question. 10 7
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court required the granting of the
injunction sought in Truax v. Corrigan,0 8 and in the course of its opin-
ion stated that state libel laws were not sufficient protection for an em-
ployer against untruthful placards carried by the pickets. The person
picketed has usually been given injunctive relief against grossly mis-
leading placards. 0 9 Since the introduction of free speech into labor
law, in one case involving the problem, the court cryptically said.
"Free speech does not legalize untruth. Nor can the Constitu-
tion be invoked as a shield against misrepresentation."'1 0
This exception to free speech in picketing cases seems proper."'
Until a few months ago, one could have avoided trying to summarize
the effect of free speech upon these various fact patterns simply by
stating that the language of the Swing case was too general, and that it
would take another decision of the Supreme Court to determine just
by the union, Tunick v. International Association, 2 C. C. H. Lab. Cas. 302
(1939-lower Calif. Court); unlawful to picket because employer was not
conforming to the N. I. R. A., Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc., v. Milk Drivers'
Union, 49 Ohio App. 303, 197 N. E. 250 (1935); illegal to picket in protest
against an employer's refusal to operate all his plant, Welinsky v. Hill-
man, 185 N. Y. S. 257 (1920). See additional problems suggested by TELLER.
supra note 8, § 114.
105 Historically, it has been held illegal to picket an employer's place
of residence, and usually, the picketing of an employee's home has been
held to be enjoinable. TELLER, supra note 8, § 115.
106 Thornhill v. Alabama, supra note 23.
10 At this point it should be noted that the federal courts have a free
speech problem to settle all by themselves. This entire paper could have
been written about what an employer can or cannot say about labor unions
in view of the Wagner Act. One famous case has recognized that employers
as well as employees have a right to speak freely. N. L. R. B. v. Ford Motor
Co., 114 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940). On this problem see: Killings-
worth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the N. L. R. B. (1941) 1941 Wis.
L. REV. 211; Dusen, Freedom of Speech and the National Labor Relations
Act, 35 ILL. L. REV. 409; Note (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 302.
106 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
100 For example, Wilner v. Bless, 243 N. Y. 544, 154 N. E. 598 (1926).
See collection of cases, TELLER, supra note 8.
110 Coward Shoe, Inc., v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 31 N. Y. S. (2d)
781, 784 (1941). See also: Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd. v. Milk Drivers' Union.
238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31 (1941).
I'l Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) where the Court found
a violation of free speech in a state injunction against continued publication
of libelous materials. But picketing involves something more than just
freedom of the press or speech, and therefore the Near case is distinguish-
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how far free speech could be carried into the field of labor law. March
31, 1942, brought forth that other decision-the Ritter case. Although
one limitation 112 was placed upon peaceful picketing by that opin-
ion," 3 the decision threw but little light on the multitude of other sit-
uations just considered. The Court recognized that state policy may be
of importance in the determination of the legality of some forms of
picketing, but it is still impossible to prophesy accurately whether a
state court can issue an injunction in Case X without being reversed.1 14
The difficulty of arguing from the specific to the general to another
specific has been adverted to previously;:" this writer has been able to
do little more than pose the problems and to express his personal views
as to their proper solution. Courts should neither dogmatically permit
all peaceful picketing nor arbitrarily censure it "illegal per se." The
facts of each case should be analyzed, and the injury to the employer,
the purposes of the union, the availability of other means, and the gen-
eral interest of society should be considered. Perhaps the Supreme
Court will establish some standards to guide this approach. If such is
done, the outcome might well be a happy one.
ONE THOUGHT IN CONCLUSION
To conclude is to speak generally, or to repeat. This writer prefers
the former but recognizes that the decided cases are too few to provide
any satisfactory basis for generalizations. Perhaps, then, it is proper to
go far afield, and to close with this thought:
The federal system presupposes a balancing of powers between the
national and state governments. By finding a federal question in picket-
ing cases, the Supreme Court has extended its power of judicial review,
and has developed a doctrine with which it can proceed constructively
to unify the treatment given labor in all the courts of the country., The
protection of civil rights against state invasion is the constitutional
basis of the free speech doctrine, and a discussion of the conflict between
the reserved powers of the states and the delegated power of the nation
is therefore unnecessary and improper. Since "freedom of speech"
under the fourteenth amendment is a restriction on state action toward
individuals, it would be hard to conceive of a constitutional power in
Congress to legislate affirmatively on the subject of what can and what
cannot be enjoined by state courts."-6 The Supreme Court, however,
by its "negative" influence"'1 can go a long way toward legislating
nationally under the guise of protecting civil rights. The fear of reversal
may be just as effective as an Act.of Congress. 111 The answer to future
picketing problems may well depend upon how strictly the Supreme
Court wants to "legislate" in this field. ROBERT A. P
able. See discussion, supra page 160.
2 Of course, the requirement of absence of violence is another limita-
tion. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairy, 312 U. S. 287
(1941).
21 That is, the free speech protection only extends to picketing within
the area of the industrial dispute.
I"' For example, see Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Int. Alliance v.
Wisc. Emp. Rel. Bd., 62 Sup. Ct. 706 (1942).
llrSupra page 157.
'11 Seemingly, a matter purely intra-state.
"7'Supra page 156.
' 18For example, Chief Justice Robinson's attitude, supra page 167.
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